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LOCAL INCOME TAXATION-
A 1953 ADDENDUM
Jefferson B. Fordham t
The purpose of this paper is to supplement a rather extended dis-
cussion of local income taxation which appeared in 1950.1 During
the interval there have been a number of legal developments of some
interest.
While there is no immediate concern with statistical coverage,
it is appropriate to state that there has been no conspicuous increase in
the employment of this form of taxation. It was put forward recently
in New York City as a likely means of meeting revenue needs, but
was not embraced by Council.
Pennsylvania remains far in the van in terms of the number of
local units levying such a tax. It is reported by the State Department
of Internal Affairs that, as of April 1, 1953, there were 286 local units
levying income taxes under the amended Home Rule Tax Act of 1947,2
in addition to Philadelphia, whose authority is derived from the Ster-
ling Act of 1932.1 Even so, the total is only eight per cent of the
3563 units eligible to impose such a tax.4 The revenue involved is
not great. Philadelphia, in 1952, reaped the substantial total of
$45,000,000 plus; all the rest collect, in the aggregate, less than a
third as much.'
Ohio continues to be the second most active local income tax state.
All Ohio municipalities have constitutional home rule power to impose
such a levy, but only nine have done so.'
t Dean of the Law School, The University of Pennsylvania.
1. Fordham & Mallison, Local Income Taxation, 10 OHIo ST. L.J. 217 (1950).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §2015.1 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1952).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4613 (Purdon Supp. 1952). In a pending case in-
volving a mercantile license tax the city is contending that the power to tax derives
from an Act of April 29, 1844, P.L. 486, the codification and reenactment of which in
1933 (Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 853) superseded the intervening Sterling Act. The
contention has been rejected in common pleas court. Philadelphia Saving Fund
Society v. City of Philadelphia, 128 LEGAL INTELLIGENcER 511, 515 (April 23, 1953).
4. TAxEs LaviD UNDER AcT 481-REcEn'Ts, NEW TAXES, RATE CHANGES,
tables 1 and 2 (Bureau of Municipal Affairs, Pennsylvania Department of Internal
Affairs, April 1, 1953). It is to be borne in mind that the 1502 second class town-
ships do not have power to levy income taxes under the act.
5. Id., table 3.
6. To the list of six cities set out in Fordham & Mallison, supra note 1, at 223,
are to be added three smaller municipalities: Campbell, Lancaster and Struthers.
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A test of home rule power to levy an income tax recently went
awry in Saginaw, Michigan.7 The City of Saginaw has a home
rule charter. In 1951 a proposed amendment, which authorized an
"excise" tax on earnings, was submitted to the electors. The pro-
posed amendment contained further provisions which related to a
change in property tax limitations and the disposition of the "excise"
tax proceeds. A favorable vote was had. Persons who would be
prospective "excise" taxpayers and one ad valorem taxpayer attacked
the amendment in an injunction suit. There was much interest in
the question of power of a Michigan municipality to provide in this
way for an income tax; but the.decision, which was adverse to the
amendment, was rested entirely on another ground of attack, namely,
that several subjects were combined in a proposed charter amendment
in violation of a single-subject requirement of the home rule enabling
act.
STATE PREEMPTION
In Ohio there is a judicially fashioned doctrine that the levy of
a state tax so far preempts the field as to oust or preclude like municipal
taxation even though the tax statute makes no reference to local taxa-
tion.8 In Pennsylvania, state preEmption is ordained by statute.' The
application of the preEmption rule is a matter of no little difficulty.
The courts of both states have had their troubles with it. In neither
state has there been adherence to subject of taxation as the test. On
occasion, as illustrated in the earlier paper, tax measure and economic
incidence have been looked to.
The principal development on this front is taking place right now
in Philadelphia. There is a case now pending in the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania which does not involve a local income tax but bears
directly upon the subject of preemption. In view of the pendency of
this case, present treatment is expository.
It will be recalled that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania deter-
mined in 1950 that Philadelphia could not apply its local income tax
to corporate dividends received by individuals nor to corporations, 0
since, as to both individual and corporation taxation, the state franchise
7. House v. City of Saginaw, 334 Mich. 241, 54 N.W.2d 314 (1952).
8. The Ohio doctrine was examined critically and at some length in Fordham
& Mallinson, szpra note 1, at 224 et seq. (1950). There have been no intervening
developments worthy of comment. The doctrine was applied in Youngstown Municipal
Ry. v. City of Youngstown, 154 Ohio St. 311, 95 N.E.2d 585 (1950), to invalidate
a municipal excise measured by gross revenue, on an urban transit company, in view
of an existing state excise measured by gross revenue.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4613 (Purdon Supp. 1952) (Sterling Act); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 2015.1A (Purdon Supp. 1952) (Home Rule Tax Act).
10. Murray v. Philadelphia, 364 Pa. 157, 71 A.2d 280 (1950).
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tax and excise tax measured by corporate net income attributable to
Pennsylvania preEmpted the field as to foreign corporations and the
state capital stock tax and excise tax measured by corporate net in-
come effected preEmption with respect to domestic corporations.
Previously, the court had determined that a Pittsburgh mercantile
license tax, the measure of which was gross income, was not barred
by state levies on domestic and foreign corporations." The Pittsburgh
tax was confined in its application to wholesale and retail merchants,
to operators of restaurants, and to brokers. With respect to the cor-
porate net income tax, the court observed that the state levy was, in
substance, imposed on property, whereas the Pittsburgh tax was im-
posed on gross volume of business. One might interpolate the ob-
servation that the stated subject of the Pittsburgh tax was the privilege
of engaging in a mercantile business; gross volume of business was
the measure of the levy. The court concluded that the franchise tax
on foreign corporations was not preEmptive, since both the subject
and the measure of that tax differed from the subject and the measure
of the city tax. The state tax, it was said, is imposed on the privilege
of doing business in the corporate form while the municipal levy is
imposed on doing a mercantile business in any form; and the state
tax is measured by the value of the corporate property in the state,
whereas the municipal impost is measured by the gross volume of busi-
ness.
The recently enacted Philadelphia mercantile license tax is broader
in application than the Pittsburgh impost. The ordinance makes
every person desiring to engage in or attempting to engage in any
business subject to the tax, and business is defined in § I (e) to mean
"the carrying on or exercising for gain or profit within the City of
Philadelphia of any trade, business, profession, or vocation, or making
sales to persons within the City of Philadelphia, or any manufacturing,
commercial or financial activity, service or business, including but not
limited to, manufacturers, brokers, wholesale dealers and wholesale
vendors, retail dealers and retail vendors."
The pending case or, more accurately cases, are equity proceed-
ings initiated in the court of common pleas to enjoin the enforcement
of the tax against various corporate plaintiffs and against investment
and security dealers doing business in Philadelphia. A class suit was
brought in the interests of the investment and security dealers.
The corporate plaintiffs in the Philadelphia case consist of saving
fund societies, a domestic and a foreign corporation engaged in the
11. Federal Drug Company v. City of Pittsburgh, 358 Pa. 454, 57 A.2d 849
(1948).
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business of making small loans and consumer discount loans, respec-
tively, and a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of
bakery products. All of the corporate plaintiffs pay state taxes mea-
sured by net income as well as other taxes or fees. In common pleas
the tax was held invalid as applied to those plaintiffs. 2
The court relied heavily upon the two Murray cases, the 1950
Supreme Court decisions previously mentioned. 3 It read the cases
to mean that the preemption provision of the statute was designed to
protect state sources of revenue by avoiding double taxation. So far
as preEmption was concerned, the court could see no difference between
a tax upon dividends in the hands of a shareholder of a corporation
which pays a net income and capital stock tax and a local tax upon
gross income of a corporation which pays a tax on net income to the
state. It regarded both as instances of double taxation of the same
subject. The Pittsburgh mercantile license tax case was distinguished
on the ground that the Pittsburgh levy was a genuine mercantile li-
cense tax, confined to those engaged as merchants or in mercantile
service activities, whereas the Philadelphia tax reaches business activity
generally. It may be added that a corporation engaged in a mercantile
business would, of course, be subject to the state tax measured by
corporate income and to the state franchise tax or the state capital
stock tax, depending upon its status as a foreign or domestic corpora-
tion.
It is of interest in this connection that the Court of Quarter
Sessions of Erie County ruled in 1950 that a municipal excise tax
of one-tenth of one per cent of the gross receipts from manufacturing
activities could not be collected from corporations; the state corporate
net income tax and the capital stock tax were said to bar the way.-
4
The court reasoned that both the local and the state taxes were im-
posed on property and, in any event, that there was double taxation
on the privilege of doing business.
CORPORATIONS
Reference has already been made to the Pennsylvania situation
under the heading of preemption. Local units in Pennsylvania simply
have not been able to reach corporations through the income tax.
In Ohio it would appear that the way is open to what the courts
regard as non-discriminatory local taxation of corporate income. In
12. Philadelphia Saving Fund Society v. City of Philadelphia, 128 LEGAL INTEL-
LIGENcER 511 (April 23, 1953).
13. Supra note 10.
14. In re Erie Gross Receipts Tax, 73 Pa. D. & C. 313 (1950).
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two cases arising in the Youngstown area, corporations have suc-
ceeded in their attacks upon local income levies regarded as discrimina-
tory. The City of Campbell levied an income tax of seven-tenths of
one per cent per annum upon net profits of corporations earned as
a result of business activities conducted in the city, but levied no in-
come tax upon individuals. The Youngstown income tax ordinance
taxed individual income at the rate of three-tenths of one per cent per
annum and corporate income at the rate of one per cent per annum. The
Court of Appeals concluded that both ordinances denied equal protec-
tion of the laws under the pertinent provisions of the state and federal
constitutions. 5 In concluding that there was no reasonable basis for the
classification, the court relied upon the well-known Quaker City Cab
Company case. 6
Since a corporation derives its privilege of doing business in the
corporate form from the state and not from any local unit of govern-
ment, it is undoubtedly easier to sustain a rate classification in a state
income tax law, which is adverse to corporations, than such classifica-
tion in a local income tax ordinance. At the same time, even though
corporate advantages do not derive from local government, they yet
are enjoyed on the local scene, just as they may be on a national scale
so far as federal income taxation is concerned. It is true that the
Quaker City Cab case has not been overruled, but it is difficult to
believe that the Youngstown ordinance, for example, would have been
in serious jeopardy in a federal court. There is nothing more com-
monplace than separate classification of individuals and corporations
for tax purposes. 17  It is common, moreover, to subject businesses
conducted in the corporate form to heavier taxation than similar busi-
nesses operated by individuals. In the cab case'there was the factor
of singling out corporations in one type of business, transportation.
That presented competitive considerations. The Ohio local taxes, how-
ever, applied to corporations generally.
Suppose the Ohio fact patterns were reversed. Would not the
court be forced to say that to tax the individual and not a corporation
or to impose a higher rate on the individual would deny him equal
protection? That is the logic of the Ohio decision. It strengthens
doubts as to the soundness of a decision which rejects an individual-
corporation classification for tax purposes.
In Pennsylvania, state preEmption bars the way so far as corporate
income is concerned. Were there otherwise substance to the equal
15. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. City of Youngstown and Youngstown
Sheet and Tube Co. v. City of Campbell, 91 Ohio App. 431, 108 N.E.2d 571 (1951).
16. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928).
17. See the authorities cited in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis
in the Quaker City Cab case, id. at 403.
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protection objection, would the factor of preEmption obviate it? Does
it necessarily follow that because the state itself does not permit the
local unit to tax evenhandedly, the equal protection question is silenced?
That hardly suggests the answer, since the state is bound by the equal
protection clause. More compelling is the contention that the local
tax does not have to be regarded for equal protection purposes in-
dependently of the state tax system.
PERSONS AND INCOME SUBJECT TO THE TAX
Perhaps the most interesting development in this branch of the
subject has been the effort to gain statutory exemption of nonresidents
from the Philadelphia income tax. It is estimated that such a change
would cost the city $10,000,000 in annual revenue. On June 11,
1953, the Senate bill embodying the proposal was defeated in the
lower house of the General Assembly. The writer, who is a "day-
light citizen" of Philadelphia, applauds this action.
One of the chief virtues of the local income tax (and it has its
policy weaknesses too) is that it provides an effective means of getting
the suburbanite to contribute to the support of the central city govern-
ment, the protection, facilities and services of which he enjoys. In
simple terms of paying something for services rendered, it is only
just that the daylight citizen pay municipal taxes in this or some other
form. He should have, moreover, a broad interest as a citizen of
the larger community in the strength and stability of the urban hub.
It is only fair to add that Philadelphia does occupy a favored
position in the Pennsylvania framework. The Home Rule Tax Act
expressly provides that a payment of a tax to a local subdivision,
pursuant to an ordinance or resolution adopted prior to the effective
date of that Act shall be allowed as a credit against any like tax
on income imposed by any other political subdivision under the author-
ity of the Act."8 This means that Philadelphia, which had an income
tax long before the Home Rule Tax Act was adopted, does not have
to take into account the income taxes of neighboring local units. Even
as to residents of those units who work in Philadelphia it is the
non-Philadelphia unit which must allow the credit. What makes this
fact the more significant is that the Philadelphia levy is one and one-
fourth per cent, whereas the aggregate levy which may be imposed
under the Home Rule Tax Act, even by overlapping units in the
aggregate, is one per cent.'
18. PA. STAT. AxNt. tit. 53, § 2015.5 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
19. PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 53, § 2015.1 (E) (c) (Purdon Supp. 1952).
1953]
1184 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
The status of persons in active military service with respect to
local taxation has been brought into the foreground by a recent deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Soldiers and
Sailors Civil Relief Act provides that for purposes of state and local
taxation of a person, his property or income, a person does not lose
his residence or domicile in a state or local unit solely by reason of
absence in compliance with military orders, nor does he acquire a resi-
dence or domicile in any other state by reason of such absence.20 The
Act expressly provides that personal property shall not be deemed to
be located or present in or to have a taxable situs at the place of duty
station. In the case to which reference has been made the Court held
that the statute effectively immunized from local property taxation the
household goods of an air force officer from Louisiana, who was on
duty station in Colorado and lived in a privately rented apartment
in the City of Denver.2 For purposes of local income taxation it seems
clear enough that, apart from any express exemption for servicemen,
a person on active duty in State B, whose permanent residence is in
State A, is subject to local income taxation at the place of his per-
manent residence in State A. The Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief
Act expressly provides that compensation for military service shall
not be deemed income earned within State B. This provision is much
easier to support than the one as to personal property because it relates
to compensation received from the government for military service.
In Ohio there is a problem of appropriate credit for taxes paid
one local unit in horizontal juxtaposition to another income tax levy-
ing unit. The matter is not regulated by statute and the municipalities
have had to chart their own courses. The original Dayton ordinance
allowed credit to residents for taxes paid to any other city on income
subject to the Dayton tax, but only to the extent of the Dayton tax
attributable to that income.22 It is not believed that this type of provi-
sion would be liable to attack on equal protection grounds, since it is
a rational effort to avoid double taxation.
Reference has already been made to the Philadelphia situation.
Other Pennsylvania local units with authority to levy income taxes
have both a vertical and a horizontal credit problem. In the hori-
zontal situation the unit of residence is favored. The enabling act
requires that an income tax paid to a unit of residence shall be credited
against such a tax imposed by any other local unit under the statute.2
20. 56 STAT. 777 (1942), as amended 58 STAT. 722 (1944), 50 U.S.C. App. §574
(1946).
21. Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322 (1953).
22. See Fordham & Mallison, supra note 1, at 257.
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 2015.5 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
LOCAL INCOME TAXATION
Since school districts are denied authority to tax the income of non-
residents, they are not directly affected by the credit provision.
In the case of overlapping units the Pennsylvania statute permits
a division, by agreement, of the available maximum levy of one per
cent. In the absence of such an agreement the act ordains that the
levy of each unit shall be one-half of the maximum.24 The division
of the available taxing power is made automatically by the statute.
One notes that this does not take into account the possibility that the
levies of two overlapping units might aggregate less than the maximum.
A Pennsylvania city, let us assume, levies a one per cent income
tax and the overlapping school district levies a one-half of one per
cent income tax. Whichever is levied first, the upshot, as to residents,
will be that the effective school district rate will be one-half of one per
cent and the effective city rate will be one-half of one per cent. Is
this the case with nonresidents who are not taxable by the school dis-
trict? May the city apply the one per cent rate to their income earned
in the city? The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has answered this
question in the affirmative.25 The court concluded that the allowance
of the credit in the vertical situation was, in substance, the same as
such an allowance in the horizontal pattern and found in neither a
violation of the constitutional requirement of uniformity. This is a
happy example of imaginative handling of a uniformity question.
Since Ohio and Pennsylvania, the two leading local income tax
states, are neighbors, there is a practical question as to the allowance
of a credit for tax paid to a local unit of another state. This question
is bothering some Pennsylvania local units in the general Youngstown
vicinity at the present time. In view of the broad position taken by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in upholding the credit device under
the Home Rule Tax Act, it is believed that a statutory provision ex-
tending the device to the interstate situation would be valid.26 It is
to be borne in mind, however, that the provision in the Home Rule
Tax Act authorizing credits is confined to Pennsylvania local units.
GRADUATION OF RATES
Nowhere is the rigidity of Pennsylvania's requirement of uni-
formity of taxation 27 more conspicuous than with respect to gradua-
24. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 53, § 2015.1(E) (Purdon Supp. 1952).
25. Minich v. Sharon City, 366 Pa. 267, 77 A.2d 347 (1951), appeal dismissed,
341 U.S. 945 (1951).
26. In the Sharon case the court relied on federal cases upholding credits
against federal taxes for state taxes paid and declared broadly: "Allowing a credit
against the payment of a tax for taxes paid to some other governmental authority
is not a violation of the constitutional requirement of uniformity." Minich v.
Sharon City, 366 Pa. 267, 270, 77 A.2d 347, 348 (1951).
27. PA. CONST. Art. IX, § 1.
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tion of rates. As the clause is interpreted, there can be no more pro-
gression in income tax rates than in the rates of ad valorem taxation.
Nor may any form of personal exemption be granted,2" even though,
as observed in a recent Ohio case, the burden of collecting the tax
on a very small income may vitiate the revenue potential.29 Thus,
it would not be possible for Pennsylvania local units to follow the
example of certain Ohio cities and exempt outright the earnings of
minors under a certain age.80
In Ohio the primary legal limitation is an equal protection clause."'
The case just adverted to involved a provision of a City of Springfield
income tax ordinance which, in effect, exempted from the tax all
persons with earned incomes of $1,040 per year or less and made the
entire earned income of persons whose incomes were more than $1,040
per year subject to the tax. In view of the factors of hardship and
administrative burden the classification was sustained. From the
standpoint of uniformity a pattern of personal exemption which ap-
plied alike to all taxpayers would obviously be more acceptable.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS-WITHHOLDING
The city of Louisville, Kentucky, imposes an "occupational li-
cense tax," the measure of which is earned gross income. In 1948 the
levy was upheld as an occupational license tax as distinguished from
a true income tax. The commonwealth had an income tax; the theory
embraced by the court enabled it to avoid preEmption difficulties. In
1950 the city annexed an area which included a federal ordnance plant.
The tract had been acquired by the government through condemnation.
Exclusive jurisdiction was obtained. In a test case the Kentucky
Court of Appeals held that the city could collect the tax from federal
personnel working at the ordnance plant. 2
By an act of 1940 Congress consented to the levy and collection
of state and local income taxes in any federal area in the taxing unit.
3 3
As defined in the act, an "income tax" is a "tax levied on, with respect
to, or measured by, net income, gross income or gross receipts." 4
Since this definition is broad enough to comprehend a levy measured
by gross earnings, the Kentucky court found the Louisville impost
28. Butcher v. City of Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 497, 6 A.2d 298 (1938).
29. City of Springfield v. Kenney, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 123, 104 N.E.2d 65 (Ohio
App. 1951).
30. See Fordham & Mallison, supra note 1, at 253.
31. OHIo CoNsT. Art. I, §2.
32. Commissioners of Sinking Fund of Louisville v. Howard, 248 S.W.2d 340
(Ky. 1952), af'd, 344 U.S. 624 (1953).
33. 61 STAT. 641 (1947), 4 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. 1952).
34. 61 STAT. 641 (1947), 4 U.S.C. § 110(c) (Supp. 1952).
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to be an "income tax" within the meaning of the federal statute. The
United States Supreme Court agreed. 35
The fact that a federal area was involved did not bar annexation.
Such an area is not an island surrounded by a state; it is in the state
and so long as the state does not interfere with the exercise of federal
jurisdiction in the federal area it is free to change its geographical
configuration of local government as by having the territory annexed
to a city. On this conclusion, too, the state and federal courts agreed
in the Louisville case.
Withholding is an administrative device of great practical im-
portance to local units which have resorted to income taxation. It is
the taxing unit's most effective answer to the problem of collecting from
the great body of wage and salary earners. Its justification on a
broader basis is a debated matter of policy, which deserves more inde-
pendent consideration than it can be accorded here.
The immediate concern is with the availability of the device where
the employer is another government. State and local units are, of
course, required by the Internal Revenue Code to withhold and the
power of Congress in the premises has not been questioned. It has
been assumed by most of us that a state or local unit could not require
the federal government to withhold. The basis for this assumption is
the supremacy theory. 6  In July, 1952, a federal statute designed to
1ave the way for federal withholding as to non-military employees was
enacted.17 The bill was so drafted as to extend the benefits to local as
well as to state income taxes. At the last moment, however, a so-
called corrective amendment, which confined federal withholding to
state and territorial income taxes, was adopted. The suggestion that
to provide for withholding of local income taxes would impose a seri-
ously objectionable burden on federal departments and agencies must
be thoroughly uncongenial to local officials. Over 100,000 local units
withhold for "Uncle Sam." Why should he not do as much for a
meagre fraction of that number of the local units?
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has in substance confirmed
what was said in the earlier paper as to withholding by the state or
other local units. If not authorized by statute the levying unit can-
35. Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624
(1953).
36. But see Roberts, "Pay-a-You-Go" Withholding Under State and Local
Income Tax Laws, 5 NAT. TAx J. 335, 341 (1952). Mr. Roberts is not satisfied
that federal immunity carries this far; there are no federal cases directly in point.
Now that Congress, as appears in-the text at note 37 infra, has consented to with-
holding in the case of a state or territorial income tax, are we not to say that the
intent is to deny withholding as to local income taxes in any event.
37. Pub. L. No. 587, 82d Cong,, 2d Sess. (July 17, 1952).
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not compel withholding. The court has held that, absent such author-
ity, a borough could not require a school district to collect an admis-
sion tax.
38
CONCLUSION
A brief, largely expository paper might well be brought to a close
without a formal "conclusion." In this instance the opportunity will be
seized to make one policy observation. The time indeed has come for
a thorough study of tax policy and fiscal relations in this country on an
adequate scale. Local income taxation, for example, can be adequately
evaluated only in the larger perspective. It is most heartening that
opportunity now affords. Congress has passed, with administration
endorsement, a measure which provides for a national commission on
intergovernmental relations in fiscal and other matters."9 This is a
great challenge. If it is properly met we shall be much better armed
to meet soundly the fiscal problems of all levels of government.
38. Wilkinsburg Borough v. Wilkinsburg Borough School District, 365 Pa. 254,
74 A.2d 138 (1950).
39. S. 1514, passed June 4, 1953, 99 CONG. REc. 6309.
